Using data from modified dictator games and a mixture-of-types estimation technique, we find a clear relationship between a classification of subjects into four different types of interdependent preferences (selfish, social welfare maximizers, inequity averse, and competitive) and the beliefs subjects hold about others' distributive choices in a nonstrategic environment. In particular, selfish individuals fall into false-consensus bias more than other types, as they can hardly conceive that other individuals incur costs so as to change the distribution of payoffs. We also find that selfish individuals are the most robust preference type when repeating play, both when they learn about others' previous choices (social information) and when they do not, while other preference types are more unstable.

ESADE

Back to home

Iriberri , Nagore; Rey Biel, Pedro

Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?

11/2013
Using data from modified dictator games and a mixture-of-types estimation technique, we find a clear relationship between a classification of subjects into four different types of interdependent preferences (selfish, social welfare maximizers, inequity averse, and competitive) and the beliefs subjects hold about others' distributive choices in a nonstrategic environment. In particular, selfish individuals fall into false-consensus bias more than other types, as they can hardly conceive that other individuals incur costs so as to change the distribution of payoffs. We also find that selfish individuals are the most robust preference type when repeating play, both when they learn about others' previous choices (social information) and when they do not, while other preference types are more unstable.
More Knowledge
Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?
Iriberri , Nagore; Rey Biel, Pedro
Quantitative Economics
Vol. 4, n 3, 11/2013, p. 515 - 547

Download full text (There might be some restrictions due to copyright or licenses)

  • File 1 (0.28Mb) pdf

Related publications

Back to home