Following the recent public debate concerning the situation of the Judicial system in Spain, the paper analyses the special position of the State in Court, essentially with reference to suits brought by individuals against the State before Spanish first instance Courts, although international Courts are touched as well. The analysis focuses on the incentives to litigate and to settle in a dispute with the State, focusing on the State's special procedural rules and the fee-shifting rules applied in the Spanish Justice system. The asymmetries in favor of the State reduce the incentives to litigate against the State, but also reduce the settlement range in order to achieve out-of-Court settlements.

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Gmez Pomar, Fernando; Gins Fabrellas, Anna; Marn Garca, Ignacio

The state in court: the economic effects of fee-shifting rules in Spain when suing the government

01/2009
Following the recent public debate concerning the situation of the Judicial system in Spain, the paper analyses the special position of the State in Court, essentially with reference to suits brought by individuals against the State before Spanish first instance Courts, although international Courts are touched as well. The analysis focuses on the incentives to litigate and to settle in a dispute with the State, focusing on the State's special procedural rules and the fee-shifting rules applied in the Spanish Justice system. The asymmetries in favor of the State reduce the incentives to litigate against the State, but also reduce the settlement range in order to achieve out-of-Court settlements.
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The state in court: the economic effects of fee-shifting rules in Spain when suing the government
Gmez Pomar, Fernando; Gins Fabrellas, Anna; Marn Garca, Ignacio
Portuguese Economic Journal
Vol. 8, n 3, 01/2009, p. 183 - 203

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